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Personal Rules and                                
Rational Willpower* 
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN** 
In my remarks on the rationality of rule following I will focus on the 
case of committing oneself in advance to a personal rule with an eye to 
resisting certain temptations.  I will discuss why, in this case, it may be 
puzzling how it could be rational to follow the rule.  And I will explore 
two lines of argument for understanding how such rule-following can, 
nevertheless, be rational. 
I.  A PROBLEM ABOUT RATIONAL WILLPOWER 
Suppose you value both pleasant dinners and productive work after 
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dinner.  One pleasant aspect of dinner is a glass of wine, and two glasses 
would be very nice.  However, a second glass of wine undermines your 
efforts to work after dinner.  So, you have a general evaluative ranking 
concerning dinners: one glass of wine over two glasses.  When you are 
in the middle of dinner, however, you are frequently tempted.  For a 
short period of time, faced with the immediate prospect of a second 
glass, you value two glasses over one glass just this once. 
Because you know that this will happen frequently, you ask yourself: 
“Can I rationally commit to a general policy—a general intention, a 
personal rule—of having only one glass of wine at dinner, a policy 
supported by my stable, evaluative ranking of an overall pattern of one 
glass over an overall pattern of two glasses, and then, when tempted, 
rationally follow through with this policy?”  What is the answer? 
II.  INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 
How should we understand this talk of rationality?  One central idea 
here is the idea of instrumental rationality.  Instrumental rationality, as I 
understand it here, is rationality relative to the agent’s current valuings, 
policies, cares, commitments, and the like.  We may challenge some of 
these attitudes as failing to track important goods, but such a challenge 
goes beyond a judgment of instrumental rationality.  And we can ask 
whether it would be instrumentally rational for you to follow through 
with your one-glass policy in the face of an evaluative ranking in favor 
of a second glass this once. 
Instrumental rationality is rationality relative to an agent’s present 
ends, valuings, and the like.  But human agents are complex, and in many 
cases there is conflict.  Our temptation case is one example: relative to 
your one-glass action policy, it is rational to refrain from the second 
glass; relative to your present directed valuing, it is rational to drink the 
second glass this once.  It is, however, typically supposed that we can go 
on to an on balance judgment that says what, relative to all your relevant 
ends and the like, it is instrumentally rational to do.  And it is commonly 
assumed that on balance instrumental rationality is rationality relative to 
the agent’s evaluative ranking at the time of action of relevant options.  
That is why it is puzzling to suggest that it might be instrumentally 
rational on balance for you to follow through with your one-glass policy 
in the envisaged circumstances. 
But why think that it is always the present evaluative ranking of 
present options that grounds on balance judgments of instrumental 
rationality?  We need to consider the roles of evaluative rankings in the 
psychic economy of our agency in order to see if these roles can justify 
the normal priority of such rankings for on balance judgments of 
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instrumental rationality.  And we need to see whether this priority can 
sometimes be defeated by a prior action policy. 
III.  STABILITY AND AUTHORITY 
Let’s distinguish two different strategies for developing the suggested 
connection between instrumental rationality, willpower, and the psychic 
economy of our agency. 
The first strategy grants that on balance judgments of instrumental 
rationality are normally anchored in the agent’s evaluative ranking, at 
the time of action, of present options.  And it grants that intentions to act 
are normally grounded in one’s evaluative rankings.  So, to treat such 
intentions as themselves an independent anchor for on balance judgments 
of instrumental rationality normally would involve an odd double 
counting, one that would support an odd bootstrapping. 
However, this strategy then goes on to consider the complex, cross-
temporal and social coordinating roles of intentions, plans, and policies. 1 
Such cross-temporal and social organization is, for agents like us, a 
means to an enormously wide range of human ends.  Intentions, plans, 
and policies, in playing these cross-temporal and social organizing roles, 
need to have a certain stability: they need to have a certain resistance to 
reconsideration and revision.  So we can ask: given a prior intention or 
policy, when would it be reasonable for the agent to reconsider or 
change it or both, and when, in contrast, would it be reasonable to stick 
with it?  In particular, might a one-glass action policy reasonably have a 
kind of stability such that it can be instrumentally rational to stick with it 
even in the face of a temporary evaluative ranking to the contrary and 
even given the ability to diverge from that policy?  If so, this would be a 
way in which, in certain temptation cases, on balance instrumental 
rationality may be anchored primarily in action policy rather than 
present evaluative ranking.  Call this the intention stability strategy. 
A second strategy notes that when we see certain attitudes as anchoring 
on balance judgments of instrumental rationality, we are seeing them as 
constituting a point of view that is in a strong sense the agent’s.  On 
balance instrumental rationality is rationality relative to the framework 
of considerations that is the agent’s own framework.  Your current 
evaluative rankings have priority for on balance judgments of instrumental 
 1. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL 
REASON (CSLI Publications 1999) (1987) (presenting the planning theory of intention). 




rationality (when they do have such priority) because they have authority 
to articulate, in the face of conflict, where you currently stand. 
Let’s say that attitudes that establish where the person himself stands 
have “agential authority.”  And let’s call this second approach the agential 
authority strategy.2
I turn first to the agential authority strategy. 
IV.  AGENTIAL AUTHORITY 
The agential authority strategy sees on balance judgments of instrumental 
rationality as relativized to the agent’s framework of relevant attitudes.  
So we need to ask which attitudes are not merely wiggles in the psychic 
stew, but rather help constitute the agent’s relevant framework. In 
particular, we need to understand why valuings, or evaluative rankings, 
normally have agential authority, and whether this rationale may fail to 
apply in certain temptation cases. 
I think there is an important connection between agential authority and 
the cross-temporal coordination and organization of one’s practical thought 
and action: a main determinant of agential authority is the support of 
such cross-temporal organization of practical thought and action, in part 
by way of continuities and connections central to a broadly Lockean 
view of personal identity over time.  We are agents who persist over time 
and whose agency is extended over time.  Attitudes that play basic roles 
in supporting and constituting cross-temporal organizing structures central 
to our Lockean persistence over time have an important claim to agential 
authority.3
Given this approach, do valuings normally have agential authority?  
Well, what is valuing? 
V.  VALUING 
As I see it, valuing is a pro attitude, one that bears a complex relation 
to value judgment.  I can recognize a wide range of goods, judge that 
they are good, but still only incorporate some of them into my practical 
 2. For talk about where you stand, see generally HARRY G. FRANKFURT, 
Identification and Wholeheartedness, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 
159 (1988) (understanding identification by appeal to  wholehearted decision).  For the 
terminology of agential authority, see generally Michael E. Bratman, Two Problems 
About Human Agency, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 309 (A.W. Price 
ed., 2001) (distinguishing agential authority from subjective normative authority and 
sketching a model of both). 
 3. See Michael E. Bratman, Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended 
Agency, 109 PHIL. REV. 35, 35–61 (2000) (exploring inter-relations between strong 
reflectiveness, planning agency, temporally extended agency, and a Lockean approach to 
personal identity). 
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reasoning and action in ways that constitute valuing.  Valuing, in a basic 
case, is a policy about one’s motivationally effective practical deliberation: I 
value X when I have a policy of treating X as a justifying consideration 
in my motivationally effective practical reasoning.4
Now, for valuing to be an anchor for on balance judgments of 
instrumental rationality, it needs to help constitute the agent’s framework 
of justifying reasons; so it needs to have agential authority.  On the present 
approach, agential authority is largely a matter of role in Lockean cross-
temporal organization of our practical thought and action.  And I think 
we can see that valuing will normally support such cross-temporal 
organization.  Valuing involves a policy of reasoning in certain ways 
over time, and of shaping one’s actions over time in accord with that 
reasoning.  So valuing will tend to support and to help constitute Lockean 
cross-temporal organization of practical thought and action.  So there is 
a strong case for saying that valuings have agential authority, and so are 
anchors for on balance judgments of instrumental rationality. 
But now we need to know whether this authority may be defeated in 
our case of temptation. 
VI.  VALUING AND AGENTIAL AUTHORITY 
Faced with a second glass of wine, you value it this time more highly 
than refraining, though you continue to value an overall one-glass pattern 
more highly than an overall two-glass pattern.  To explain in what your 
valuing two glasses just this once consists, however, we need to adjust 
our account of valuing.  I have said that to value is to have a relevant 
policy about practical reasoning.  However, your valuing of two glasses 
this one time is—unlike a general policy about practical reasoning—only an 
intention about present practical reasoning.  It is a singular commitment 
to give relatively more justifying weight, in present motivationally effective 
practical reasoning, to a second glass. 
As a singular commitment, the primary role of this singular valuing is 
to structure your present reasoning and action.  In contrast, your general 
action policy of having only one glass of wine at dinner has the role of 
 4. For further complexities, see generally Michael E. Bratman, Valuing and the 
Will, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 249 (2000) (developing a model of valuing as a policy about 
weights in deliberation, within a Gricean strategy of “creature construction”); see also 
generally Michael E. Bratman, Autonomy and Hierarchy, in AUTONOMY 156 (Ellen 
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2003) (analyzing the pressure on valuings to be higher-order 
attitudes). 




organizing thought and action over time, in part by way of associated 
continuities and connections.  So, given our approach to agential 
authority, there is a case for saying that this action policy, in contrast 
with your singular valuing, has the stronger claim to agential authority.  
So it may be on balance instrumentally rational for you to follow 
through with your one-glass action policy, despite your present directed 
evaluative ranking to the contrary. 
VII.  INTENTION STABILITY 
Return now to the strategy of intention stability.  We seek norms of 
intention stability that can, in certain cases, make (instrumental) sense of 
sticking with a prior action policy in the face of a conflicting evaluative 
ranking.  And here I want to emphasize two ideas.  First, given the roles 
our planning agency plays in coordination over time and socially, there 
are pragmatic pressures in the direction of stability of intention-like 
attitudes.  Second, there is an important role here for a concern with 
future regret.5
Given that we are agents with limited cognitive resources, on many 
occasions we simply maintain our prior intentions as time goes by and 
even in the face of new information. However, sometimes we do stop 
and reconsider.  When is it reasonable not to reconsider?  Here I have 
proposed a two-tier pragmatic theory, one that seeks strategies of 
nonreconsideration that would promote the agent’s ends.  And because 
planning agents normally care about the cross-temporal integrity of their 
lives and normally identify with their anticipated ends in their planned 
for future planning agency, the ends relevant to stability will normally 
include such future ends.  I conjecture that such a two-tier theory will 
support a defeasible default in favor of nonreconsideration. 
It is not clear, however, how to extend this approach to a temptation 
case in which you do, indeed, reconsider whether to stick with your one-
glass policy.  It is clear to you, once offered the second glass, that you 
value drinking it this time more highly than refraining.  But you wonder 
whether you should nevertheless stick with your prior one-glass policy. 
Now, the usefulness of stability of plan-type attitudes that lies behind 
the pragmatic account of reasonable nonreconsideration does, I think, 
also support some sort of defeasible, default presumption in favor of 
following through with one’s prior intentions and policies even when 
one does reconsider whether to do so.  Or, anyway, there is such a 
presumption so long as one does not distrust the earlier process of 
 5. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of 
Intention, in FACES OF INTENTION 58 (1999). 
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intention or policy formation.  To grant this pragmatically grounded default 
in favor of the prior intention or policy is not, however, to see that 
intention or policy as providing a further—potentially bootstrapping—reason 
in deliberation.  It is only to see it as establishing a burden of proof on a 
challenge to that intention or policy.6
The problem we now face, however, is that normally this default 
presumption will be overridden by a present evaluative ranking that 
ranks a specific alternative strictly higher than what one had intended.  
After all, your prior intentions and policies concerning action are 
themselves normally formed primarily on the basis of your evaluative 
rankings.  To give an action-focused policy priority over such an evaluative 
ranking would normally be criticizable prior policy worship.7
How then are we to explain why it might be instrumentally rational for 
you to stick with your prior one-glass policy despite your present ranking in 
favor of a second glass?  What we need is an explanation of why, in such 
a temptation case, this evaluative ranking may fail to override the default 
in favor of the prior policy of action. 
VIII.  ANTICIPATED FUTURE REGRET 
It is here that I want to appeal to anticipated future regret.  In the 
temptation case you know, let us suppose, that if you were to be guided 
by your evaluative ranking in favor of a second glass you would later 
regret it, and that if instead you were to stick with your one-glass policy 
you would later be glad that you did.  A planning agent projects her 
agency into the future in a way that normally involves identifying with 
how she will see matters then.  And this provides a ground for giving 
significance to anticipated future regret. 
Because of concerns with policy worship, we needed to see the default 
in favor of a prior action policy as normally defeated by a present 
evaluative ranking to the contrary.  But a planning agent’s knowledge 
that she would regret acting on that evaluative ranking, and would be 
glad if she, instead, stuck with her prior policy, can delegitimize that 
 6. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 203–06 (Tony Honoré & 
Joseph Raz eds., 1991) (arguing that a rule can have a presumptive force that is not 
solely a matter of epistemic uncertainty, but is defeatible by strong reasons for not 
following it). 
 7. Analogous to what J.J.C. Smart calls “rule worship.”  See J.J.C. Smart, 
Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 171, 177 (Philippa Foot 
ed., 1967). 
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evaluative ranking.  So it may sometimes be instrumentally rational for 
you to follow through with your one-glass action policy despite your 
present directed evaluative ranking to the contrary.  And this argument 
avoids policy worship—for we continue to hold that the pragmatically 
grounded default presumption in favor of a prior policy of action is 
normally overridden by a present evaluative ranking to the contrary. 
IX.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
So we have two arguments for instrumentally rational willpower in the 
face of temporary, singular evaluative temptation.  Both arguments see 
instrumental rationality as shaped by basic structures of our temporally 
extended planning agency. 
This raises the question of how exactly these arguments interact with each 
other.  It also raises the question of whether versions of these arguments 
extend to other domains—for example, to a shared policy of a group or 
institution.  But these are matters for a different occasion. 
 
